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FOREWORD
The "national interest" is a composite declaration derived
from those values that a nation prizes most–liberty, freedom,
security. Interests are usually expressed in terms of physical
survival, economic prosperity, and political sovereignty. The
list invariably expands, and is ultimately shaped by subjective
preferences and political debate. As an object of political
debate, the concept of national interest serves to propose,
justify, or denounce policies.
Because the national interest is the foundation for both the
National Security Strategy and its supporting National Military
Strategy, it is essential that military leaders understand the
political context from which the details of the national interest
emerge. The guiding concept of national interest is more often
assumed than analyzed in the dynamic context of domestic and
international politics. For these reasons, Dr. Michael Roskin,
Visiting Professor of Foreign Policy, was asked to synthesize the
academic literature, focusing on those works that had greatest
value and relevance to members of the national security community
who must apply as well as serve the national interest.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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NATIONAL INTEREST:
FROM ABSTRACTION TO STRATEGY
England has neither permanent friends nor permanent
enemies; she has permanent interests.
Lord Palmerston
The student new to international relations is often at first
intoxicated by the concept of "national interest." It seems
crisp, clear, objective: what's good for the nation as a whole in
international affairs. (What's good for the nation as a whole in
domestic affairs is the public interest.) National interest lies
at the very heart of the military and diplomatic professions and
leads to the formulation of a national strategy and of the
calculation of the power necessary to support that strategy.
Upon reflection, however, one realizes how hard it is to turn
concepts of national interest into working strategy. It requires
one to perceive the world with undistorted clarity and even to
anticipate the second- and third-order effects of policies. Few
are so gifted. Instead of bringing clarity and cohesion, many
quarrel over what the national interest is in any given
situation. The author of this monograph will argue that the
concept of national interest still has utility, not as an
objective fact but as a philosophical argument in favor of
limiting the number of crusades a country may be inclined to
undertake.
Philosophical Background.
"National interest" traces its roots at least back to the
pessimistic realism of Machiavelli in the 15th century.1 As such,
it represents a repudiation of earlier Western sources in
Hellenic idealism, Judeo-Christian biblical morality, and the
teachings of medieval churchmen such as Thomas Aquinas. You may
have splendid moral goals, argued Machiavelli, but without
sufficient power and the willingness to use it, you will
accomplish nothing. Machiavelli's overriding aim: Italian
unification and liberation from foreign occupiers. Nothing could
be more moral than the interest of the Italian state; therefore
seemingly immoral ends could be employed for its attainment.
Power rather than morality is the crux of this school.
At least one element of the medieval church survives in
national interest thinking. Humans have souls, and these are
judged in an afterlife, they argued. Accordingly, humans can be
held to exacting standards of behavior with curbs on beastly
impulses. States, being artificial creations, have no souls; they
have life only in this world. If the state is crushed or
destroyed, it has no heavenly afterlife. Accordingly, states may
take harsh measures to protect themselves and ensure their
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survival. States are amoral and can do things individual humans
cannot do. It is in this context that churchmen such as Thomas
Aquinas proposed theories of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.2
Clausewitz also contributes to the national interest
approach. All state behavior is motivated by its need to survive
and prosper. To safeguard its interests the state must rationally
decide to go to war; there should be no other reason for going to
war. Unlimited war, however, is foolish, for it serves no
national interest.3 By this point, concepts of raison d'etat or
Staatsraison were long and firmly embedded in European thinking.
The Founding Fathers practiced a cautious realism in
preserving and expanding the 13 original states, indicating they
understood the concept of national interest. Washington's
farewell address showed a shrewd appreciation of national
interest:
Europe has a set of primary interests which to us
have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must
be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of
which are essentially foreign to our concerns . . .4
During the 19th century the United States pursued its
national interests by means of cash and/or force in ridding its
continent of non-hemispheric powers. Less and less, however, it
called its actions "national interest," and by the 20th century
national interest in the United States took a back seat to
ethical and normative approaches to international relations. If
considered, it was given short shrift as dirty German Realpolitik
as practiced by Bismarck. As was typical of American political
science in its first decades, Woodrow Wilson despised as amoral
or even immoral approaches that used power, national interest,
and recourse to violence as normal components of international
relations.5 America had a higher calling than that. Wilson's
father was a minister, and Wilson trained as a lawyer; he was
thus steeped in what George F. Kennan called the
"legalistic-moralistic approach" prevalent in America.6
Realism Comes to America.
With the flight of scholars from Europe in the 1930s,
however, American universities became exposed to what were called
"realist" approaches that utilized national interest as their
primary building block. The truly powerful mind of Realism, as he
called his approach, the man who more than any other acquainted
Americans with the idea of national interest, was the German
émigré Hans Morgenthau (1904-80; no relation to FDR's treasury
secretary). Bringing the wisdom of Machiavelli and Clausewitz
with him, Morgenthau told Americans that they must arm and oppose
first the Axis and then the Soviet Union not out of any abstract
love of liberty and justice, but because their most profound
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national interests were threatened. "International politics, like
all politics, is a struggle for power," he wrote.7
Morgenthau's writings immediately sparked controversy and to
this day are not uniformly accepted. They go against the grain of
the Wilsonian idealism that was and still is taught as
international relations on some college campuses.8 American
scholars resisted what they perceived as Germanic amorality. Many
American academics and decisionmakers still prefer "world order"
approaches that posit peaceful, cooperative behavior as the
international norm. Denunciations of Morgenthau circulated much
as "anti-machiavells" had circulated to refute the wicked
Florentine. McGeorge Bundy of Harvard, for example, during the
late 1950s taught an international relations course devoted
entirely to denouncing Morgenthau.
Actually, Morgenthau, a friend and collaborator of Reinhold
Niebuhr, was deeply moral. His theory was, at bottom, a normative
one, a philosophical argument for how states ought to behave. He
argued that if states pursue only their rational self-interests,
without defining them too grandly, they will collide with other
states only minimally. In most cases, their collisions will be
compromisable; that is the function of diplomacy. It is when
states refuse to limit themselves to protection of their rational
self-interests that they become dangerous. They define their
interests too broadly, leading to a policy of expansionism or
imperialism, which in turn must be countered by the states whose
interests are infringed upon, and this can lead to war. When
states make national interest the guide of their policy, they are
being as moral as they can be. We can't know what is good for the
whole world or for country X; we can only know what is good for
us.
Interest Defined as Power.
Morgenthau supposed he had an objective standard by which to
judge foreign policies: were they pursuing the national interest
defined in terms of power?9 That is, was the statesman making
decisions that would preserve and improve the state's power, or
was he squandering power in such a way that would ultimately
weaken the state? The statesman asks, "Will this step improve or
weaken my power?" The foreign policy of any state--no matter what
its "values"--can thus be judged rationally and empirically. It
matters little whether the national values are Christianity,
Communism, Islam, or vegetarianism. Only one question matters: Is
the statesman acting to preserve the state and its power? If so,
his policy is rational.
A policy of "improving" the state's power is not to be
confused with territorial expansion, which is the hallmark of
dangerous and disruptive imperialist powers, against whom the
prudent statesman is always on guard.
3

With power as a yardstick Morgenthau had no trouble defining
the national interest at any given time and under any
circumstance. He was uncannily prescient. He also had no
difficulty in reading the minds of statesmen both dead and alive.
"Using national interest defined as power, we look over the
statesman's shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we read and
anticipate his very thoughts."10 Did Morgenthau have this ability
because he applied some formula of national interest or because
he was tremendously intelligent? Lesser minds have tried to
define certain policies as national interest and have thereby
committed egregious errors. Overseas expansion, for example,
might appear to enhance state power by the influx of new riches.
But it may also drain state power by spreading it too thin and
engaging too many enemies. A giant empire may actually ruin the
state; the Spanish Habsburgs put themselves out of business.
Hitler flung away German power and ruined the state.
There are times when the statesman must move decisively to
engage his armed forces in the threat or practice of war. When
the borders or existence of the state are threatened by an
expansionist or imperialist neighboring state, one must arm and
form alliances, and it is best to do so earlier rather than
later. Accordingly, one of the great tasks of the statesman is to
scan the horizon for expansionist or imperialist threats. Any
state engaged in expanding its power is pursuing a "policy of
imperialism," wrote Morgenthau. A state merely intent on
preserving itself and conserving its power is pursuing a "policy
of the status quo." The statesman is able to tell one from the
other despite the imperialist's claim to be for the status quo.
When you see a Hitler on the march, arm yourself and form
alliances. Do not wait for him to flagrantly violate some point
of international law, such as the invasion of Poland, for that
might be too late. Britain and France, more intent on the details
of international law, failed to understand the imperialist thrust
behind German moves in the late 1930s.
Potentially the most dangerous policy is one of declaring
certain interests to be vital but then not backing up your words
with military power. This is a "policy of bluff" and tends to end
badly, in one of two ways: either your adversary sees that you
are bluffing and continues his conquests, or you belatedly
attempt to back up your words, in which case you may have to go
to war to convince him that you were not bluffing. One horrifying
example is the U.S. policy of angry words at Japan in the 1930s
over its conquest of China, words unsupported by military power
or any inclination to use it. Tokyo could simply not believe that
China was a vital U.S. interest; the Americans were bluffing. Was
not poker, the game of bluff, the Americans' favorite card game?
Something similar occurred in Bosnia: many strong words from
the United States and the West Europeans, unsupported by military
power or the intent to use it. Quite reasonably, the Serbs
4

concluded we were bluffing, and they were right. Always back your
interests by adequate power. If you don't have the power, don't
declare something distant to be your interest. Thou shalt not
bluff.
Vital and Secondary Interests.
Morgenthau saw two levels of national interest, the vital
and the secondary.11 To preserve the first, which concerns the
very life of the state, there can be no compromise or hesitation
about going to war. Vital national interests are relatively easy
to define: security as a free and independent nation and
protection of institutions, people, and fundamental values. Vital
interests may at times extend overseas should one detect an
expansionist state that is distant now but amassing power and
conquests that later will affect you. Imperialist powers that
threaten your interests are best dealt with early and always with
adequate power.
Secondary interests, those over which one may seek to
compromise, are harder to define. Typically, they are somewhat
removed from your borders and represent no threat to your
sovereignty. Potentially, however, they can grow in the minds of
statesmen until they seem to be vital. If an interest is
secondary, mutually advantageous deals can be negotiated,
provided the other party is not engaged in a policy of
expansionism. If he is engaged in expansionism, compromises on
secondary interests will not calm matters and may even be read as
appeasement.
Additionally, Realists distinguish between temporary and
permanent interests,12 specific and general interests,13 and
complementary and conflicting interests.14 Defense of human rights
in a distant land, for example, might be permanent, general, and
secondary; that is, you have a long-term commitment to human
rights but without any quarrel with a specific country, certainly
not one that would damage your overall relations or weaken your
power. Morgenthau would think it absurd for us to move into a
hostile relationship with China over human rights; little good
and much harm can come from it. A hostile China, for example,
offers the United States little help in dealing with an
aggressive, nuclear-armed North Korea. Which is more important,
human rights in China or restraining a warlike country which
threatens U.S. allies? More often than not, political leaders
must choose between competing interests.
Two countries, even allies, seldom have identical national
interests. The best one can hope for is that their interests will
be complementary. The United States and Albania, for instance,
may have a common interest in opposing Serbian "ethnic
cleansing," but the U.S. interest is a general, temporary, and
secondary one concerning human rights and regional stability. The
5

Albanian interest is a specific, permanent, and possibly vital
one of forming a Greater Albania that would include Serbian-held
Kosovo with its Albanian majority. Our interests may run parallel
for a time, but we must never mistake Albanian interests for U.S.
interests.
TYPES OF NATIONAL INTEREST
Examples
Importance

Vital
Secondary

No Soviet Missiles in Cuba
An Open World Oil Supply

Duration

Temporary
Permanent

Support for Iraq in Opposing
Iran
No Hostile Powers in Western
Hemisphere

Specificity

Specific
General

No Japanese Trade Barriers
Universal Respect for Human
Rights

Compatibility

Complementary
Conflicting

Russian Cooperation in Bosnia
Russian Support for Serbs
Table 1.

It is sometimes hard to anticipate how another country will
define its national interest. Each sees things through different
eyes. Hungary in the 1990s has been very cooperative with the
West and eager to join NATO. In 1994, however, when the United
States and France proposed air strikes to curb Serbian artillery
atrocities in Bosnia, Hungary stopped the U.S. use of its
territory for AWACS flights. An American looking at this refusal
is puzzled: "But don't they want to be on our team?" A Hungarian
looking at the refusal says, "We'll have to live with the Serbs
for centuries; that border is a vital, permanent interest for us.
Some 400,000 ethnic Hungarians live under Serbian control in
Voivodina as virtual hostages. The Americans offer no guarantees
of protection, but they expect us to join them in an act of war.
Sorry, not a good deal." (The AWACS flights were quickly restored
as the crisis passed.)
The diplomat's work is in finding and developing
complementary interests so that two or more countries can work
together. (Better diplomatic spadework would have signalled in
advance the difference between Hungarian and U.S. interests in
1994.) Often countries have some interests that are complementary
and others that are conflicting, as when NATO members cooperate
to block the Soviet threat but clash over who will lead the
alliance. The French-U.S. relationship can be described in this
way. Where interests totally conflict, of course, there can be no
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cooperation. Here it is the diplomat's duty to say so and find
ways to minimize the damage. Do not despair in this situation, as
national interests can shift, and today's adversary may be
tomorrow's ally.
Much national interest thought has a geographical component;
that is, a country, waterway, or resource may have a special
impact on your national interest. Britain, for example, had a
permanent, specific, and often vital interest in the Netherlands.
Who controlled the Low Countries had the best invasion route to
England. (For the blue-water types: the northerly winds that
sweep between England and the Continent allow a sailing vessel to
take a beam reach, the fastest point of sail, west from Holland
to England. Here the winds, in facilitating rapid invasion,
helped define England's national interest.) Whether the threat
was Habsburg emperors, French kings, or German dictators, Britain
felt it had to engage to secure this invasion springboard.
Morgenthau found much folly in U.S. policy during the cold
war, some of it on geographical grounds. He thought it irrational
that the United States could tolerate a Soviet puppet state,
Cuba, near our continent while we engaged in Vietnam on the other
side of the globe. Cuba was a vital interest, Vietnam was not.
Morgenthau spoke against the Vietnam war as an irrational crusade
that did nothing but drain American power in an unimportant part
of the world.15 At this same time, many claimed Vietnam was a
vital U.S. interest. How can you tell at that moment who's right?
Morgenthau's favorite contemporary statesman was Charles de
Gaulle of France, whom he called extraordinarily intelligent. De
Gaulle indeed was able to pursue French national interests
without undue sentimentality. When he realized that French
colonies, especially Algeria, were a net drain on French power,
he cut them free despite the howls of French imperialists. A
richer, stronger France emerged from decolonization. De Gaulle
also reasoned that no state willingly entrusts its security to
foreigners, so he built a French nuclear force and kicked the
Americans out of France. (In confining U.S. forces to the narrow
width of Germany, he also pushed them into an implied doctrine of
early first use, thus assuring France precisely the U.S. nuclear
guarantee that it sought.)
Variations on Morgenthau.
Gradually, Morgenthau's powerful arguments caught on.
Operating independently of Morgenthau, the diplomatist-historian
George F. Kennan came to essentially identical conclusions from
his studies of U.S. and Soviet foreign policies.16 Protestant
theologian Reinhold Niebuhr insisted that Christians must look at
the this-worldly impact of aggression and be prepared to counter
it; pacifism is a form of Christian heresy, for it requires the
Christian to stand impotent in the face of evil.17
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Perhaps the greatest damage done to Realism was by those who
embraced it but misunderstood and misused it. By the 1960s,
Realism was part of mainstream thinking, just in time to be used
to support President Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam war.
Vietnam hawks used Morgenthau's reasoning to justify the war: an
expansionist power was swallowing one country after another and
would not be stopped until defeated by force of arms. A Communist
victory in Southeast Asia would destabilize the U.S. defense,
economic, and political presence in all of Asia. Stop them there
or stop them later. Here the great weakness of national interest
thinking came out with a vengeance: Precisely how can you tell
when a genuinely vital national interest is at stake?
National interest thinking has also been misused by
idealistic interventionists who wish to expand U.S. interests so
that they include some kind of "world interest." They would like
to use U.S. power to right wrongs the world over. A "crusade" may
be thus defined as the use of one's power in causes little
related to the national interest. In our day, for example, one
hears many prominent people, in and out of government, claim that
slaughter of civilians in a distant war is a vital U.S. interest,
for if allowed to spread such behavior will eventually threaten
U.S. interests. They often use Nazi Germany and Munich as
analogies. In defining national interest so broadly, however,
they turn it into altruism: "By helping the victims of
aggression, we make the world a safer, more stable place, and
that redounds to our benefit," they argue. An altruist has been
called someone who defines his self-interest so broadly that it
includes everybody's interest. On such a basis, Morgenthau would
argue, the United States could be engaged permanently in half a
dozen wars around the globe, a frittering away of U.S. power that
could come to no good end.
True national interest thinking is rather tightly limited to
your nation. It is a constant temptation to expand your thinking
beyond your nation's interest to include many nations' interests
or the world's interest, and under certain circumstances you may
wish to do this, but please do not call it "the national
interest." If you do, you may soon be "fighting for peace" in
many spots around the globe. The great utility of national
interest thinking is to tap the statesman on the shoulder and
ask, "Is this proposed effort for the good of your country or to
carry out an idealistic abstraction?"
Feasibility is linked to national interest; power is the
connecting link. An infeasible strategy--where your power is
insufficient to carry out your designs--is inherently a bad
strategy. If the type of power is wrong for the setting (e.g.,
heavy tanks to counter Vietnamese or Afghan guerrillas; air power
to stop a three-sided civil war), you are undertaking an
infeasible strategy.
8

Further, remember that objectively any country's expansion
of its power is a "policy of imperialism." If you are expanding
your power even for the noblest of causes, to save the world or
to save country X, other nations, even friendly ones, still see
it as imperialism. Once we have sufficient power to stabilize
conflicts, prevent aggression, and stop nuclear proliferation, we
will have accummulated so much power that we are de facto king of
the world. For some curious reason, other nations resent this;
they can't understand that our power will be used only for good.
This is the story of U.S. power both during the cold war (e.g.,
French resentment) and after it (e.g., Russian resentment).
One can make as many gradations and subdivisions in the
national interest as one wishes. Donald Nuechterlein, for
example, saw four levels rather than Morgenthau's two: survival,
vital, major, and peripheral.18 Examined more closely, though,
survival interests concern only destruction in nuclear war (a
subset of vital), and peripheral interests are too minor to
concern us. Thus we are back to Morgenthau's two: vital and
secondary. You could devise a 10-point or 20-point scale of
national interests if you wished, but its precision is spurious
as it will soon reduce itself to the dichotomy of interests worth
going to war for and interests upon which one may compromise. As
William of Ockam put it: Do not needlessly multiply entities.
Warping Effects on the National Interest.
At any given time, the national interest may be difficult to
define due to the warping effects of ideology, the global system,
public and elite convictions, the mass media, and policy inertia.

Ideology. An ideology is a plan to improve society, or at
least a claim to be able to do so. Ideology closely parallels
religion, except the former aims to improve things in this world
rather than in the next. People caught up in an ideology often
exhibit religious-like fervor and disregard of empirical reality.
The opposite of ideology is pragmatism. Morgenthau and other
realist thinkers generally scoff at ideology and claim it is
essentially a trick to justify dictatorship. The dictator himself
generally takes ideology with a big grain of salt while pursuing
a policy of national interests. Did Lenin withdraw Russia from
World War I because it was a dirty imperialists' war or to save
Russia from further dismemberment at the hands of the advancing
Germans? In the 1936-39 Spanish Civil War, Stalin ordered the
Comintern volunteers in Spain to adopt an extremely moderate,
nonrevolutionary line. Stalin was trying to convince Britain and
France to join him in the struggle against Hitler. Without such
an alliance, Soviet vital national interests were threatened.
Communist ideology or Spanish democracy had nothing to do with
it; the security of Soviet territory was all Stalin cared about.
Ideology can be changed at the drop of a hat. Stalin stopped
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excoriating Nazi Germany in 1939 because he couldn't get any
cooperation out of Britain and France to secure his western
borders, so he turned to Hitler to get a deal for the same end.
By the same token, Winston Churchill, a fire-breathing
Conservative, explained why Britain was now in alliance with the
Soviet Union: "If Hitler invaded hell, I would find a few good
words to say about the devil in the House of Commons."
Ideological differences or affinities do not matter, only
safeguarding one's country matters. Later in the war, the
redoubtable Brigadier Maclean reported back from Yugoslavia that
Tito's Partisans were Communists and would communize Yugoslavia
after the war. Churchill took the news without surprise and asked
Maclean, "Do you intend to make Yugoslavia your permanent
residence after the war?" Maclean allowed as he did not. "Good,"
nodded Churchill, "neither do I." The ideology of postwar
Yugoslavia was not uppermost in his mind, indicated Churchill;
the survival of Britain in the war was.
But what of the true believer, the revolutionary who still
acts on his ideology? Such people are extremely difficult to deal
with because they ignore their own national interests and are
thus unpredictable. Typically, their passion does not last long
as they become acquainted with the burdens of governing and
preserving their country. Lenin started switching from ideology
to pragmatism almost immediately upon seizing power, for now he
had Russia to take care of. If they are unable to switch, they
may destroy their entire region, including their own country, as
Hitler did. Notice how after the death of Khomeini, Iranian
policy has gradually become more pragmatic. Ideology and national
interest are at odds; a country caught up in ideology is
typically unable to pursue a policy of national interest, which
requires a calm, uncluttered view of reality.

Global System. The global configuration of power may also
warp national interest thinking. Late in the 19th century, with
the globe largely carved up by European imperial powers, many
countries felt compelled to grab the leftover pieces to prove
themselves major powers. A kind of contagion or copy-cat effect
warped the national interest, leading to the U.S. seizure of the
Philippines from Spain. Teddy Roosevelt engineered the move but
some years later regretted it when he noticed that the
Philippines had become a U.S. vulnerability in the Pacific, one
that had to be defended at great cost from the Japanese. It is
easy to declare something to be your national interest but hard
to back out afterward.
A world divided by many powers is quite different from one
divided by just two superpowers.19 Probably the biggest
distortions came in the latter case, that of cold war bipolarity,
a zero-sum game that tended to make everything important. Limited
definitions of the national interest fell by the wayside, and the
superpowers plunged ever deeper into obscure corners of the world
as if one more client state proved they were winning. Laos,
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Ethiopia, Afghanistan, everything became the national interest.
Only Antarctica remained outside the superpower competition. Like
the Sherwin-Williams paint symbol, national interests "cover the
earth" and thus lose their utility. You must be able to
discriminate and rank national interests lest you spread your
power too thin and in areas of little importance.
In a bipolar situation, the hegemonic superpower of each
camp is forced, in order to hold its alliance together, to take
on the national interests of each client state. One of the causes
of the 1948 Tito-Stalin split, for example, was Tito's insistence
that Trieste belonged to Yugoslavia. Trieste may have been a
Yugoslav national interest, but it was not a Soviet national
interest, and Stalin was reluctant to provoke the British and
Americans over it. The United States was reluctant to come to
French aid in the first Indochina war; it was not a U.S. national
interest. To draw France into the common defense of Europe in the
early 1950s, however, it was necessary to support French
imperialism on the other side of the globe. U.S. involvement in
Indochina started as a bribe to get French cooperation in Europe.
The care and feeding of the alliance becomes a dominant national
interest, one that blots out a careful review of military
engagement in a distant swamp.
The clients, of course, feel little obligation to make the
national interests of the hegemon their own. France did not come
to the aid of the United States in Indochina; de Gaulle, in fact,
told the Americans they were quite foolish. Aside from the
Soviets, no members of the Warsaw Pact had any interest in
Afghanistan. The bipolar world thus produces a tail- wags-dog
effect in pushing the hegemon to defend the clients with no
reciprocity implied. As such, bipolar systems come under great
stress and have finite life-spans. This bothers a Realist not at
all, for no alliance lasts forever; they change as the national
interests of their members change. An alliance is not an end in
itself; it is merely one device that, for a certain time, may
support the national interest.
The collapse of the bipolar world of the cold war now
permits an un-warping or normalizing of national interests. Laos,
Ethiopia, and Afghanistan now receive precisely the attention
they merit. We are no longer so solicitous of our European
friends, whose national interests may diverge from and even
conflict with ours. We are not desperate to hold together NATO
and may now tell the Europeans to feel free to do whatever they
wish; we may or may not back them up, depending on our national
interests involved. Notice how the end of the cold war brought
some very tough talk and inflexible positions in the GATT
negotiations to lower trade barriers. There was no longer much
reason for the United States to be especially nice to the West
Europeans and East Asians on trade; it seemed to be high time for
Washington to look out for U.S. economic interests.
11

Public and Elite Convictions. While not as explicit as
ideologies, the culture, values, and convictions of a country can
also warp definitions of the national interest. Every country has
national values, but the statesman who acts on them without
reference to the national interest risks damaging the nation. The
long American missionary experience in China convinced many
Americans that China was our responsibility to save and uplift.
The result was war with Japan. The cultural and ethnic affinities
of many Americans lead them to automatically support their
country of origin and to define its national interests as
America's. The Israeli and Greek lobbies are quite influential,
even though Israeli and Greek interests sometimes diverge from
U.S. interests. The Greek lobby, for example, made Washington
hesitate for years before officially recognizing Macedonia.
A lack of interest can also be warping. If left to itself,
some analysts believe, U.S. mass opinion tends toward
isolationism; that is, it sees no important national interests
anywhere. Americans are especially indifferent to Latin America,
which is seen as having no impact on the United States except for
drugs and illegal immigrants. Americans mistakenly but deeply
believe there are few U.S. national interests there.
Elites--the top or most influential people--pay far more
attention to foreign affairs than the public at large; therefore
they are instrumental in defining national interests. The
anglophilia of the WASP elite of the Northeast inclined America
to enter two world wars to defend Britain. This inclination was
not shared by the Midwest, where elites were more Irish and
German in origin; hence the "isolationism" of the Midwest.
Economic elites may define U.S. holdings abroad as the
national interest. United Fruit saw Arbenz's reforms in Guatemala
as a threat to their bananas and hence to the United States. ITT
saw Allende's takeover of the ITT-owned Chilean telephone network
as a threat to U.S. interests. Some critics wonder if the U.S.
war against Iraq was a defense of national interests or
oil-industry interests.
Educational elites may awaken or keep alive issues that do
not interest the public at large. By inculcating a "world order"
view of global politics, educators may convince students that
distant problems are vital U.S. interests. As young officials
these students may carry idealistic views with them into
government agencies and news organizations. Some young State
Department officials resigned when they could not get their way
in defining Bosnia as a U.S. interest.

Mass Media. Especially important in awakening the broader
public to questions of national interest are the mass media.
Unfortunately, they do so on a capricious basis little grounded
in calm calculation. One noted columnist made the Kurds his pet
national interest. Addicted to "good visuals" and "action
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footage," television goes where the action is and brings back
images of maimed or starving children ("If it bleeds it leads").
Implicit in the images is the message that atrocities so terrible
automatically become a U.S. interest. The media can be highly
selective, giving extensive coverage to horrors in Bosnia but
ignoring similar horrors in Peru, Sri Lanka, or Angola. South
America would have to sink before U.S. television would cover it.
To have the media set the national interest is to let show-biz
take over the guidance of the nation.

Policy Inertia. Once a policy is set, it takes on a life of
its own and may continue indefinitely.20 The nature of bureaucracy
is to keep marching in the direction initially set, which may
include definitions of the national interest. The situation may
change over time, but not the bureaucracy. Dean Rusk testified
that South Vietnam had become a vital U.S. interest because we
had sunk so much foreign aid into it. Henry Kissinger later said
that even if Vietnam had not initially been a U.S. interest, the
U.S. commitment of blood and treasure had put U.S. credibility on
the line and thus turned Vietnam into a vital interest. On this
basis, you can create national interests anywhere in the world
where previously you had none.
The Utility of National Interest.
If the definition of the national interest can be warped in
so many ways, what good is the concept? It's only as good as your
ability to perceive reality accurately, a gift granted to few.
For the rest of us, to get an accurate fix on the national
interest it would be necessary to travel into the future in a
time machine to see how things worked out under a given policy.
The real national interest is sometimes knowable only many years
after the fact. Second- and third-order effects of a policy are
often wildly unpredictable.
In the mid-1960s, Vietnam seemed to most Americans to be a
national interest; a decade later few thought it had been one.
The victorious Communists in Vietnam, having impoverished their
country, now seek to enter the capitalistic world market economy.
Funny how things work out.
As noted above, the real problem is when reputedly
intelligent, well-informed analysts come down on opposing sides
in defining the national interest. Who can the statesman trust?
"National interest" is often used on a polemical basis, with each
side claiming to have the true picture.
The utility of national interest is not in any formula that
can untangle complex issues. Beware of anyone trying to sell you
a formula or pat answer; there are none. National interest is
useful in training the decisionmaker to ask a series of
questions, such as: How are current developments affecting my
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nation's power? Are hostile forces able to harm my vital
interests? Do I have enough power to protect my vital interests?
Which of my interests are secondary? How much of my power am I
willing to use to defend them? What kind of deals can I get in
compromises over secondary interests? The net impact of these
questions is to restrain impetuous types from embarking on
crusades.
Morgenthau's argument is that the world would be a much
better place if all statesmen would consistently ask such
questions, for that would induce a sense of limits and caution
into their strategies that might otherwise be lacking. For those
who simply will not keep their national interests defined tightly
and close to home but instead are intent on expanding their power
(imperialism), Morgenthau's approach is also useful. The
statesman is constantly scanning the horizon to detect the growth
of hostile power centers, and if they seem likely to impinge on
his national interests he formulates strategies to safeguard
them, each step grounded on adequate power.
The national interest approach is terribly old-fashioned,
and some thinkers argue it has been or must be superseded by
"world interest" or "world order" approaches, which go beyond the
inherent selfishness of national interest. Empirically, however,
one would still find national interest a better predictor of
state strategy than world order. In a crisis, when it comes to
putting their troops in harm's way, statesmen still ask
themselves, "What is my nation's interest in all this?" It's
still not a bad question.
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